Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
Nietzsche and Objectivism

Unit One: January 31 - February 20

Eyal Mozes' Comment
on Jason Ticknor-Schwob's Essay
Master and Slave in
Friedrich Nietzsche's
Geneology of Morals and Beyond Good and Evil
with follow-up discussion

Sent: Tuesday, February 08, 2000 3:58 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: E Mozes' commentary on Jason Ticknor-Schwob's Pt. 1 Review essay

From: [Eyal Mozes]

Commentary on Jason Ticknor-Schwob's essay


Jason Ticknor-Schwob anticipates our discussion of Part IV, centering his
essay on comparing Nietzsche's discussion of master and slave morality with
points in Rand's ethics. In this commentary, I question Jason's
interpretation of those points in Nietzsche's method and content which he
regards as similar to Rand. As far as I can see, the only similarities Jason
supports are negative ones, demonstrating that Rand and Nietzsche are
against some of the same things, e.g. they are both against Christianity.
Jason's attempts to compare method and positive content are unsuccessful.

The comparison that I find least plausible is Jason's claim that Nietzsche
has anticipated "Rand's question" in regard to values. Rand started her
analysis of values by asking what are values and why man needs them, rather
than taking the question of "what values should man pursue?" as one's
starting point. Jason claims that Nietszche has anticipated this approach,
but I see nothing in the readings, or in the passages Jason cites, to
support this claim. As Walter Kaufmann states in the passage Jason quotes,
"As he saw it, his predecessors had simply taken for granted that they knew
what was good and what was evil. Moral judgments had simply been accepted as
incontrovertible facts, and the philosophers had considered it their task to
find reasons for them." Nietzsche sees himself as questioning ideas about
the *content* of morality, about what is good or evil, that had previously
been accepted as incontrovertible fact; but, like the thinkers he questions,
he too takes the question of what values man should pursue as a starting
point, not showing concern for what values are or why man needs them.

Even on the more narrow kind of questioning of dogmas described by Kaufmann,
it is not clear just how important such questioning is to Nietzsche. Observe
that the main target of Nietzsche's polemics in Genealogy of Morals is Paul
Ree, who suggests that the concept of morality is essentially a mistake and
a result of forgetfulness. While I agree with Nietzsche about the total
implausibility of Ree's theory, Ree's theory is certainly highly
unconventional, and he seems to qualify as a questioner of dogmas about
morality at least as much as Nietzsche. The fact that Nietzsche devotes so
much space to refuting Ree indicates that overturning established dogmas
about morality, or asking new and previously unasked questions about it, are
not his main concern.

The one aspect in which Nietzsche does question traditional morality, not
only in its content but in its fundamental premises, is in his questioning
of free will. The clearest expression of this in the readings is, I think,
in Genealogy of Morals section 13. Nietzsche suggests that blaming those who
practice the master morality is like blaming birds of prey for being birds
of prey; he questions the existence of an acting, choosing agent who chooses
to practice the master morality and could have chosen otherwise. Here,
Nietzsche is indeed challenging a basic premise at the base, not only of
Christianity or of altruism, but of *any* morality, including one which
would regard the master morality as better; you can't blame birds of prey
for being birds of prey, but you can't morally praise them for it, either.
(This relates directly to Stephen Hicks' question c in his opening essay;
Nietsche's view clearly is reductionistic and deterministic.)

I also find Jason's comparison, of Nietzsche's concept of Ressentiment with
Rand's idea of "hatred of the good for being the good", to be unconvincing.
Nietzsche regards the slaves' resentment of the masters as being the result
of the fact that the masters' strength is objectively a danger and a source
of pain to them; as he states in Genealogy of Morals section 13, "there is
nothing very odd about lambs disliking birds of prey". Rand portrayed her
idea of "hatred of the good for being the good" in fictional form through
the characters of Rearden's family, and their resentment towards his
productive ability, of which they are the beneficiaries. As far as I can
see, such resentment has no similarity at all to the analogy used by
Nietszche, of resentment of lambs towards the strength of birds of prey.

In sum, I don't think Jason is successful in showing any important sense in
which Nietzsche's concepts of master and slave moralities have anticipated
aspects of Rand's approach; neither in his method of approach to the
subject, nor on points of content such as the concept of Ressentiment.

Eyal Mozes


*****************************************************
Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
cybersem@objectivistcenter.org

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*****************************************************

 

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 8:59 AM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Re: E Mozes' commentary on Jason Ticknor-Schwob's Pt. 1 Review essay

[From Kevin Hill ]

[Eyal Mozes wrote in his commentary:]

> Nietzsche sees himself as questioning ideas about
>the *content* of morality, about what is good or evil, that had previously
>been accepted as incontrovertible fact; but, like the thinkers he
>questions,
>he too takes the question of what values man should pursue as a starting
>point, not showing concern for what values are or why man needs them.

What Nietzsche says is that he asks what value these values have, which,
understood as he intends it, is not the same thing as simply asking what
values we should pursue.

I wanted to jump in and make a few quick clarifying remarks. The above
remark seems to suggest that Nietzsche's objection to Christianity is that
it is arbitrary--why not be *against* Christianity instead? However,
Nietzsche's objection is not a sheer assertion of his own preference, or a
dogmatic inversion, "you have been told ruth is good, but I say unto you,
ruthlessness is good". Rather, Nietzsche *begins* his analysis of morality
by asking what morality is *for*. Whether this is or is not similar to Rand
is another question (offhand, it sounds similar to me). His answer is that
morality is a tool whereby a human *living* being attempts to enhance its
*life*. The critique of morality cannot be abstracted from his vitalist
"will to power" ontology and psychology.

Now there are a variety of different ways that Nietzsche can and does
criticize a moral code, but they all presuppose this vitalist foundation. A
moral code can be objectionable because it is self-deceived (it claims to be
not self-aggrandizing at someone else's expense when it in fact is). A moral
code can be objectionable because it represents a feeble attempt to cope
with one's own vital weakness by parasitically sabotaging the health of the
strong. A moral code can be objectionable because it diminishes the overall
amount of flourishing in the world. A moral code can be objectionable
because it inspires self-destructive behavior in people who would, but for
its influence, flourish. And so on. All these claims, which Nietzsche does
accuse slave morality of, depend crucially on his vitalism.

(1) I think the proper place for locating the differences between Rand and
Nietzsche is not in the move of grounding morality in vital considerations,
but rather in their conception of what (human) *life* is. Since for
Nietzsche life just *is* exploitation (how inconsiderate are we of the
animals we eat?), he sees no basis for a distinction between using nature
and using other people, since we, like other living beings, must transform
the world (and other people are part of the world) to our own ends. Rand, by
contrast, focuses on reason as our distinctive means of being alive, and
then shows how rational production is not compatible with using others in
the way that Nietzsche permits. Nietzsche focuses on what makes us like
other living things, Rand on what distinguishes us from other living beings.

(2) There is another distinction--whereas Rand tries to understand the code
she objects to in terms of it being rooted in a choice against life, what
Nietzsche would call asceticism, Nietzsche believes that such a choice is
not really possible--even the ascetic is trying, in a convoluted and
ineffectual way, to enhance his own vitality.

(3) Finally, their conceptions of vitality differ. For Rand the fundamental
contrast is existence or non-existence. For Nietzsche, the fundamental
contrast is between expansion and contraction. Striving to exist for
Nietzsche is second-best, a failure to expand, a kind of dog-paddle or
running in place.

best regards,
Kevin Hill


*****************************************************
Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
cybersem@objectivistcenter.org

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*****************************************************