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You stated, "Rand saw the first act of free will as the first moral act, to focus or unfocus one's mind. "
Of course there's the problem of free will, which I won't go into too much right now (though, we can discuss it if you wish). Any rigorous notion of free will is going to necessitate a rejection of the law of identity (and causality). But, perhaps we can save this account by using 'free will' in another way. Maybe a free will is simply a will not immediately influenced by outside factors. So, let us assume for the sake of argument that I have not made a moral act before. In this moment I decide to focus my mind. That seems rather vague, but I guess I can get a fuzzy notion of what it means. Perhaps it means being more aware of myself and my surroundings? Or paying attention? Being an active agent of action?
You stated, "You might say that we will to know the truth, as honestly as we can, or we evade or are too lazy to seek the truth. In the latter case our errors aren't intellectual ones. They are moral ones for which we deserve censure."
Ok, so when I focus my mind with my 'free' will I will to know the truth. Sure, most people do in fact want to know the truth (I don't think I've met anyone who wills falsehood). But, more than simply wanting truth, we should be significantly motivated towards it (this, I'm guessing, is what you mean by the 'too lazy' .. people who aren't motivated enough.) So, when people don't have a sufficient amount of motivation, then they are morally blameworthy. Seems that we're begging the question, at this point, since we havn't established the moral standard, but fair enough.
You stated, "Ideas, of course, guide our actions and ideas cover pretty much everything concerning human beings. "
Hmmm... I don't believe that account is complete. I guess it depends on what you mean by 'ideas' though. If ideas simply means some sort of mental content, then you're right. If it just refers to beliefs, then I'm a bit more skeptical. Beliefs alone don't motivate people. A corollary desire is necessary for motivation. If a person places no value on doing X, then all the beliefs in the world won't convince them to do it.
I agree with you about habits and the difficulty of morality. Whatever the good is, it is better achieved through a focused will to achieve it.
You stated, "As to the truth value of an moral propositions, I think Rand does do good job in the Objectivist Ethics and elsewhere of showing the errors of the fact/value dichotomy. The standard of value is human life, the life of man qua man. For each of us any given action should be judged by us in accordance with that standard."
This is where we disagree, fundamentally. After reading Rand's VoS, I failed to find a single deductively sound argument for her conclusion. I understand that living entities only continue living if certain processes or actions take place. I understand that the organs of our body can either help or hurt those ends. What I don't understand is this... What is the connection between that and morality? Why should I care about life? Why should I choose my own life over the lives of others? I'm not suggesting that I personally don't enjoy and prefer life, but what I happen to like or dislike is not important in this context. What I happen to like is only subjectively valuable, not objectively valuable.
Rand, like any other person, is allowed to stipulate that 'good' means that which is conducive to that individual's life, but its nothing more than a stipulation at that point. It would be equally valid for me to say that 'good' means that which is conducive to the eating of mud pies.
Why life? Why not death?
You stated, "First, what is specifically the best for me at a given time and in a given context might not be the best for you. If I want to be an astronomer, studying for my test tomorrow will be good for me but if you have no interest in this field and aren't taking a test, why study? While the moral principles are the same for all individuals, the manifestations in our own lives and in terms of our specific value pursuits will be different."
Sure, I agree. Morality, in practice, must be context sensitive.
You asked what I meant with my 3rd point, which was, "If Agent A is rational, and sincerely judges X to be right, and believes P to be the best means of achieving X, then A will be motivated to P."
I was asking whether Objectivism agrees or disagrees with that statement (and the other two statements as well). My concern is not over the relationship between means and ends. For the sake of narrowing the focus of my concer, I am willing to grant (for this discussion), that means and ends are a unity. My question concerns the connection between rationality, morality, and motivation. If Joe thinks its wrong to eat meat, but Joe isn't motivated to stop eating meat, is he being irrational?
As a side note, I am humbled and honored by your attention to my questions. I enjoy reading your articles and appreciate your insights. I have never been able to discuss objectivism with such a person, and I'm excited to think about the wisdom we might share with each other.
Andrew
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